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INTRODUCTION
Courts in this country have long recognized the dangers of eyewitness testimony:
“[T]he influence of improper suggestion upon identifying witnesses probably accounts
for more miscarriages of justice than any other single factor.” United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218, 229 (1967). Indeed, in its effort to address concerns about the risk of
eyewitness misidentification, this Court has been on the forefront of efforts to incorporate
social science research findings into the law governing the admissibility of eyewitness
identification evidence. State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 493 (Utah 1986); State v. Ramirez,
817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991). Concerns about eyewitness misidentification are particularly
acute where, as here, the testimony of a single eyewitness is the sole evidence of a
defendant’s guilt.
This case presents this Court with an opportunity to re-examine the legal
framework for assessing eyewitness identification evidence, a task it has not done in the
30 years since it decided Ramirez. Over that period, social scientists have conducted
extensive research in the area of eyewitness memory and perception that has significantly
advanced our understanding of how memory works and what factfinders know about
human memory. During the same period, the work of organizations like Amicus Curiae
the Innocence Project have shed light on the role of eyewitness misidentification in
contributing to wrongful convictions established through post-conviction DNA testing.
Indeed, eyewitness misidentification is the leading contributing cause of wrongful
convictions established through DNA, playing a role in 72 percent of 342 DNA
exonerations to date.
1

These developments, together with this Court’s commitment to ensuring that the
law governing eyewitness identification evidence is fully aligned with the findings of
social science research, require revisiting and updating Ramirez, as both the majority and
dissenting judges in the court below agreed.
Scientific research amply supports the Court of Appeals’ ruling that the witness’s
identifications of Mr. Lujan should not have been admitted. The conditions under which
Mr. Lujan was identified—the poor lighting, the fact that the perpetrator wore a hat and
was of a different race than the victim, and that the victim experienced high levels of
stress at the time he claimed to have viewed Mr. Lujan—have all been shown to
negatively affect memory. State v. Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, ¶ 2, 357 P.3d 20.
Likewise, scientific research confirms that suggestive circumstances like those
surrounding the show-up and in-court identifications in this case influence not only the
reliability of the identification itself, but also the many self-reported factors that the
Ramirez test relies on to determine the admissibility of a challenged identification.
This research can help to explain why the witness, who had three opportunities to
identify Mr. Lujan, was only able to do so where suggestive circumstances made that
identification obvious—first, at a highly suggestive show-up, where Mr. Lujan was
handcuffed and was the only person not in a police uniform, id. ¶ 6, and then in an incourt identification at a preliminary hearing, where Mr. Lujan was the “only defendant at
counsel table” and the only reasonable choice, id. ¶ 8. In contrast, the witness was unable
to identify Mr. Lujan when he was presented as part of a six person lineup that was fairly
composed and administered. Id. ¶ 7. The witness’s inability to identify Mr. Lujan in the
2

absence of suggestive circumstances that communicated to him that Mr. Lujan was the
perpetrator suggests that the witness had not formed a reliable memory of the perpetrator
at the time of the crime such that he could make a later accurate identification.
In addition, the Court of Appeals correctly determined that the State had not
carried its burden of showing that the trial court’s admission of the eyewitness
identification was harmless error. Studies have shown that jurors tend to overvalue
eyewitness testimony, overestimate the likely accuracy of eyewitness testimony, and
confuse an eyewitness’s certainty with his or her accuracy. Because the eyewitness’s
testimony was crucial to the prosecution, the admission of the eyewitness identifications
was not harmless error. Id. ¶ 17 (“When the man’s identifications of Defendant are
removed, the State’s case is severely weakened.”).
Accordingly, this Court should affirm the Court of Appeals’ decision and take this
opportunity to revisit Ramirez in light of the last three decades of social science research
and data from the DNA exonerations. In so doing, this Court should reaffirm that the
appropriate approach to such evidence is a totality of the circumstances test that allows
for trial courts to consider any relevant factors based on a consensus in social science
research and should clarify what factors now enjoy a consensus in the social science
research. Moreover, this Court should provide guidance to the lower courts on the use of
intermediate remedies, including expert testimony, robust jury instructions, and limits on
unreliable aspects of admissible eyewitness testimony, which can blunt the prejudicial
effects of identification testimony that is the product of suggestive procedures or that may
be unreliable, but is nonetheless admissible.
3

ARGUMENT
I.

THIS COURT SHOULD REVISIT THE RAMIREZ FRAMEWORK BECAUSE
IT IS UNDERMINED BY DECADES OF SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH
A.

This Court Has Recognized and Attempted to Guard Against the Dangers
of Eyewitness Testimony for Decades

This Court first recognized and attempted to address the dangers of eyewitness
identification testimony thirty years ago. It was one of the first state supreme courts in
the country to do so. In State v. Long, the Court reviewed the scientific literature and
concluded that it was “replete with empirical studies documenting the unreliability of
eyewitness identification.” 721 P.2d 483, 488 (Utah 1986). The Long Court also
recognized that, “[a]lthough research has convincingly demonstrated the weaknesses
inherent in eyewitness identification, jurors are, for the most part, unaware of these
problems.” Id. at 490. To address these concerns, the Court required trial courts to give
cautionary instructions on eyewitness identification testimony when requested by the
defense in appropriate cases. This instruction would be used to “pinpoint identification
as a central issue and highlight the factors that bear on the reliability of that
identification.” Id. at 492.
The Court revisited the issue of eyewitness identification testimony five years later
in State v. Ramirez. The Court’s opinion in that case reiterated its commitment to
tackling the problems posed by eyewitness testimony through the application of scientific
research findings to judicial decision making. The Ramirez Court established a
framework for the admissibility of eyewitness identifications that required “an in-depth
appraisal of the identification’s reliability,” 817 P.2d 774, 780 (Utah 1991), and that
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rejected the federal standard, which the Court found to be “scientifically unsound.” Id. at
779–81. Critical to the Court’s decision was its view that the scientific literature, which
it had described and relied on in Long, compelled it to adopt “an analytic course that
diverges somewhat from that in federal case law.” Id. at 780.
This Court most recently sought to refine its approach to eyewitness testimony in
State v. Clopten, 2009 UT 84, 223 P.3d 1103. There, the Court focused on the fact that
“[d]ecades of study . . . have established that eyewitnesses are prone to identifying the
wrong person as the perpetrator of the crime.” Id. ¶ 15. In light of that concern, it sought
to align Utah’s rules of evidence with the latest research on expert eyewitness
identification testimony. Id. ¶¶ 14, 16–18, 21–25, 30, 34 (recognizing that cautionary
instructions and cross-examination were “poor substitutes” for expert eyewitness
testimony and holding that the Utah rules of evidence should allow for “liberal and
routine admission” of such testimony). Although this Court has revisited issues relating
to eyewitness identification testimony as part of its commitment to tackling this difficult
issue, the Ramirez framework for assessing the reliability and the admissibility of such
testimony remains in place. When it was issued in 1991, Ramirez represented an
important step forward in this area. But the same commitment to aligning the law with
scientific research on eyewitness identification that this Court has shown in cases such as
Clopten, now highlights the need to revisit the framework established in Ramirez.1
1

Indeed, because it took current scientific research into account to modify the law on the
admissibility of eyewitness expert testimony, Clopten calls the viability of the Ramirez
test into question. The modifications requested by the Innocence Project would bring the
Ramirez test into line with Clopten.
5

B.

Social Science Research Since Ramirez Demonstrates that the Ramirez
Factors Are Insufficient to Protect Defendants from the Dangers of
Eyewitness Identification Testimony

The Ramirez test requires trial courts to consider the “totality of the
circumstances,” which “must” include five enumerated factors:
(1)

“The opportunity of the witness to view the actor during the event;

(2)

[T]he witness’s degree of attention to the actor at the time of the event;

(3)

[T]he witness’s capacity to observe the event, including his or her physical and
mental acuity;

(4)

[W]hether the witness’s identification was made spontaneously and remained
consistent thereafter, or whether it was the product of suggestion; and

(5)

[T]he nature of the event being observed and the likelihood that the witness
would perceive, remember and relate it correctly. This last area includes such
factors as whether the event was an ordinary one in the mind of the observer
during the time it was observed, and whether the race of the actor was the same
as the observer’s.”

817 P.2d at 781.
The Ramirez Court set itself apart from federal and other state supreme courts by
applying a test that was expressly designed to “meet or exceed in rigor the federal
standard as expressed in Biggers and Stovall.” Id. at 780. Rejecting some of the federal
test’s criteria as “scientifically unsound,” the Court refined the factors in the federal test,
expressly including consideration of race, and expressly rejecting witness certainty as an
indicator of reliability. Id. at 780–81. In other respects, the Ramirez test mirrored the
6

federal test, however. Both include the “opportunity of the witness to view” the
perpetrator during the crime, and the “witness’s degree of attention,” factors that are, in
many cases, evidenced by the witness’s own reporting of events which can undermine
reliability. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199–200 (1972).
Although Ramirez relied explicitly on then-current scientific studies, research in
the field has continued to advance. Indeed, current social science research demonstrates
that the Ramirez factors are insufficient to protect defendants from the dangers of faulty
eyewitness identifications. Most importantly, in the 25 years since Ramirez, scientists
studying eyewitness memory have come to understand more fully the power of
suggestion. Today, research has demonstrated that suggestive circumstances can both
(1) significantly impair a witness’s ability to make an accurate identification; and
(2) artificially inflate a witness’s testimony concerning the other factors that remain part
of both the federal and Utah tests.
Neither of these concerns is adequately addressed in the Ramirez test. That test
buries the issue of suggestion in factor four: “whether the witness’s identification was
made spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter, or whether it was the product of
suggestion.” 817 P.2d at 781 (emphasis added). This treatment of suggestion is both
inaccurate and incomplete. First, it incorrectly implies that identifications that are
spontaneous and consistent have not been tainted by suggestive circumstances. In truth,
social scientists agree that suggestive circumstances can lead to a witness being more
consistent and insistent in his or her identification. See Charles A. Goodsell et al., Effects
of Mugshot Commitment on Lineup Performance in Young and Older Adults, 23 Applied
7

Cognitive Psychol. 788, 789 (2009); Kenneth A. Deffenbacher et al., Mugshot Exposure
Effects: Retroactive Interference, Mugshot Commitment, Source Confusion, and
Unconscious Transference, 30 Law & Hum. Behav. 287, 299 (2006). Thus, in
considering factor four, courts may conclude that an identification is reliable and
admissible because it was spontaneous and the witness was consistent, even if the very
reason it appears reliable is that the identification was tainted by suggestion.
Second, and more problematic, the Ramirez test fails to identify or offer courts
guidance on how to address the pernicious effect of suggestive circumstances on witness
memory, including as manifested in the other factors courts are required to consider.
Indeed, in the 25 years since Ramirez, scientists have shown that that when an
identification procedure is tainted by suggestion, that suggestion can contaminate a
witness’s memory of the event, undermining the accuracy of the evidence most likely to
be used to gauge reliability—the witness’s own testimony. Many studies have
characterized at least two of the Ramirez factors—opportunity to view and degree of
attention—as prone to this problem. See, e.g., Gary L. Wells & Amy L. Bradfield,
“Good, You Identified the Suspect”: Feedback to Eyewitnesses Distorts Their Reports of
the Witnessing Experience, 83 J. Applied Psychol. 360, 366–67 (1998) (finding that the
effect of suggestion was “large or very large” on witnesses’ “reports of certainty, view,
ability to make out features of the face, attention, basis for making an identification, the
amount of time taken to make an identification, willingness to testify, and trust of an
identification made under these conditions”). Because suggestive circumstances can
influence a witness’s memory and recollection of both the original event and the
8

identification procedure itself, courts should be wary of basing a finding of reliability on
these factors, which depend largely on witness testimony.
The New Jersey Supreme Court recognized that these flaws are inherent in the
federal test in State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011). It observed that “[t]he irony
of the current test is that the more suggestive the procedure, the greater the chance
eyewitnesses will seem confident and report better viewing conditions.” Id. at 918.
Indeed, since Henderson, other courts and the prestigious National Academy of Science
have highlighted the same flaw in the federal test. See State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673,
687 (Or. 2012); Young v. State, Nos. A-11006/11015, 2016 WL 3369222, at *16 (Alaska
June 17, 2016); National Academy of Sciences, Identifying the Culprit: Assessing
Eyewitness Identification, at 65–66, available at http://www.nap.edu/read/18891/
chapter/6#65 (“NAS Report”). Even though Ramirez improves upon the federal test in
this regard—by rejecting a balancing approach and focusing on reliability as the primary
concern—Ramirez does not go far enough to solve the problems identified in Henderson.
Under Ramirez, trial courts are instructed to consider “self-reported” factors, but are not
given guidance on how suggestion can influence those factors or how it can undermine
the reliability of an identification more generally. Thus, although the Ramirez test takes
suggestive circumstances into consideration, as it should, it fails to adequately account
for the interplay between suggestive circumstances and the other factors.
In addition, since Ramirez, scientific research has confirmed and reinforced that
witness memory—and therefore accuracy—can be affected dramatically by factors that
are present at the time of the crime (known as “estimator variables,” including stress, the
9

presence of a weapon, the race of the witness and the perpetrator, and disguises as
seemingly minor as hats) and factors that are present at the time of the identification
procedure(s) (known as “system variables,” including the use of an administrator who
does not know the identity of the suspect, pre-lineup witness instructions, and fair
composition of the identification procedure). See, e.g., Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court Study Group on Eyewitness Evidence, Report & Recommendations to the Justices,
at 59–71 (July 25, 2013), available at http://www.mass.gov/courts/docs/sjc/docs/
eyewitness-evidence-report-2013.pdf (“SJC Report”); NAS Report at 65–69. The
importance of these factors should not be overlooked; indeed, they likely undermined the
reliability of the eyewitness identification in this case. This Court should take into
account this extensive body of research and consider the effect that these variables can
have on witness memory.
Ensuring that the law remains aligned with the last 25 years of scientific research
requires revisiting Ramirez. Both the majority and dissent in the Court of Appeals agreed
that it is time for this Court to revisit Ramirez, and Amicus Curiae respectfully asks this
Court to do the same. See Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, ¶ 10 n.1 (“All of this, taken
together, indicates that it is time for our Supreme Court to reconsider Ramirez, a
proposition with which the dissent agrees.”).
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C.

This Court Should Confirm that Ramirez Requires a Totality of the
Circumstances Approach, with Expert Testimony and Procedural
Safeguards, to Limit the Harmful Prejudicial Effects of Unreliable
Eyewitness Identification Testimony

In order to address the problems with the Ramirez test, this Court should, first,
reiterate and reemphasize the importance of the “totality of the circumstances” nature of
the Ramirez test. The Court should also give guidance to the lower courts sufficient to
allow them to give meaning to the term and to do so in a way that is consistent across the
state. Amicus Curiae respectfully submits that this Court should instruct the lower courts
to consider the “totality” of factors that are supported by a consensus of social science
research and to take this opportunity to identify and explain those factors that currently
enjoy such consensus. The Court should emphasize nevertheless that the list of factors
courts should consider in evaluating eyewitness identification evidence should be flexible
enough to allow for the evolution of the relevant science, in recognition of the fact that
scientific research is dynamic. As the Supreme Courts of New Jersey and Connecticut
have instructed, “‘[t]rial courts [should not be limited] from reviewing evolving,
substantial, and generally accepted scientific research.’” State v. Guilbert, 49 A.3d 705,
735 (Conn. 2012) (quoting Henderson, 27 A.3d at 922); see also Lawson, 291 P.3d at
685–86 (recognizing that “research is ongoing” and cautioning that the court’s
acknowledgment of the current research “is not intended to preclude any party . . . from
validating scientific acceptance of further research”).
In other words, judicial understanding of the term “totality of the circumstances”
should be given full force and effect: lower courts should consider the universe of factors

11

that bear on reliability in the particular case, regardless of whether any particular factor
fits neatly into the five “reliability” factors enumerated in Ramirez. Emphasizing the fact
that the Ramirez test requires consideration of the totality of the circumstances, including
all system and estimator variables, the degree of suggestiveness, if any, and the effect of
that suggestion on other factors, would reduce the likelihood of wrongful convictions
based on suggestive identification procedures, like the show-up and in-court
identification used in this case, or identifications that scientific research shows are
otherwise likely to be unreliable.
We respectfully submit that, to accomplish this goal, the Court should issue
findings on the current body of scientific research to guide lower courts on the factors
they should consider in assessing the admissibility and reliability of eyewitness
identifications. This Court should make these findings by evaluating the current body of
research on its own as the Oregon Supreme Court did in State v. Lawson,2 by appointing
a special master3 or creating a study group,4 or by adopting the findings set forth by other

2

(See Lawson appendix attached as Addendum A.)

3

The New Jersey Supreme Court appointed a special master to evaluate scientific
evidence on eyewitness testimony. The special master heard testimony from seven
experts that produced more than 2,000 pages of transcripts and reviewed hundreds of
scientific studies. The special master issued an “extensive” 86-page report that the court
later reviewed and adopted in part. See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 877.
4

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts convened a study group on eyewitness
identification to “offer guidance as to how our courts can most effectively deter
unnecessarily suggestive identification procedures and minimize the risk of a wrongful
conviction.” SJC Report at 1; Commonwealth v. Walker, 953 N.E.2d 195, 208 n.16
(Mass. 2011) (announcing that the court will convene the study committee “[b]ecause
eyewitness identification is the greatest source of wrongful convictions but also an
12

courts, as the Alaska Supreme Court did in State v. Young. After issuing such findings,
the Supreme Court of Oregon articulated an approach to the admissibility of eyewitness
identification that screens eyewitness identification testimony through a stringent and
precise application of the rules of evidence.5 Any of these approaches, if adopted here,
would address the problems of the Ramirez test and ensure that trial courts throughout the
state will evaluate identification evidence in light of more than thirty years of generally
accepted scientific research findings about memory, perception and eyewitness
reliability.
The Oregon Supreme Court’s decision in Lawson is instructive in this regard.
There, the court sua sponte conducted a review of the social science research concerning
eyewitness identification, reviewing more than 2,000 scientific studies. Lawson, 291
P.3d at 685. After concluding that the Manson/Biggers factors incorporated in the
Oregon state test for evaluating identification evidence6 did not adequately ensure the
reliability of eyewitness identification evidence, it took judicial notice of scientific
invaluable law enforcement tool . . . and because the research regarding eyewitness
identification procedures is complex and evolving”). The study group issued its report in
2013, and the Supreme Judicial Court has ruled on its recommendations as they are
presented in cases before the court. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gomes, 22 N.E.3d 897,
900 (Mass. 2015) (adopting provisional jury instructions based on the study group’s
findings).
5

Alternatively, the Court could instruct the Supreme Court’s Advisory Committee on the
Rules of Evidence to analyze current scientific research and reform the rules of evidence
accordingly.
6

The Manson/Biggers factors that were incorporated into Oregon’s test for the
admissibility of eyewitness identifications prior to Lawson contained some of the same
factors found in Ramirez: the witness’s opportunity to view the crime and the witness’s
degree of attention to the perpetrator. See Lawson, 291 P.3d at 684.
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research findings and set out a comprehensive list of the variables courts should consider
in weighing the reliability of this type of evidence. (See Addendum A.) The Lawson
court explained its approach:
[W]e believe that it is imperative that law enforcement, the bench, and the
bar be informed of the existence of current scientific research and literature
regarding the reliability of eyewitness identification because . . . the
reliability of eyewitness identification is central to a criminal justice system
dedicated the dual principles of accountability and fairness.
Id. at 685. This same principle applies equally here. The list of factors that can affect the
reliability of eyewitness identifications is long and is not always well understood by
litigants, jurists or jurors. By setting forth the factors that trial courts should consider in
evaluating eyewitness identification evidence, this Court can encourage courts and
factfinders to bring the law as it is practiced every day in courts throughout the state into
alignment with current scientific research. In addition, requiring courts to consider
relevant system variables, such as blind administration, fair lineup construction, prelineup instructions, and recorded, contemporaneous witness confidence statements will
have the salutary effect of reducing the suggestiveness of out-of-court identification
procedures, as well as in-court identification procedures that are based on out-of-court
identifications.
The Supreme Court of Alaska recently took a similar approach to this issue in a
decision issued in June of this year. In State v. Young, it rejected its state version of the
Manson/Biggers test and adopted a new test to evaluate the reliability of eyewitness
identifications, aligning their standard with the findings in Lawson and Henderson.
Young, 2016 WL 3369222 at *19. The court concluded its extensive analysis of the
14

scientific research findings by holding that courts’ “analysis of reliability should consider
all relevant system and estimator variables under the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at
*29.
This Court should follow its sister courts in Alaska, Oregon, and New Jersey in
comprehensively identifying the relevant system and estimator variables that trial courts
and factfinders should consider when evaluating the reliability of eyewitness
identifications. Identifying what scientific research currently considers the relevant
variables while emphasizing the need to remain flexible to allow for the evolving nature
of scientific research in the area will ensure that lower courts will evaluate the reliability
of eyewitness identification through an approach that gives meaning to the term “totality
of the circumstances,” and, most importantly, will reduce the risk of misidentification.
In addition, where eyewitness identification testimony is ruled admissible, trial
courts should use intermediate remedies, such as expert testimony and robust jury
instructions, to blunt the prejudicial effects of any remaining unreliability and to provide
jurors with context and information to appropriately analyze this evidence. Although
courts have historically relied on cross-examination and closing arguments to expose the
unreliability of eyewitness identification testimony, social science research has shown—
and this Court itself has recognized—that these methods are largely ineffective at
bringing the unreliability of a mistaken but honest witness’s identification to light. See,
e.g., Clopten, 2009 UT 84, ¶¶ 21–22 (“[R]esearch shows the effectiveness of crossexamination is badly hampered [where eyewitnesses express certainty about
identifications that are inaccurate].”); accord Guilbert, 49 A.3d at 725–28; State v.
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Copeland, 226 S.W.3d 287, 299–300 (Tenn. 2007) (citing scientific studies
demonstrating that cross-examination is insufficient to educate the jury on the relevant
factors).
Likewise, as this Court has also recognized, robust, carefully written jury
instructions that are grounded in science and tailored to the facts of the case should be
used to caution jurors that the factors that affect reliability may be counterintuitive. See
Long, 721 P.2d at 492. As with Ramirez, Utah was a leader in adopting an eyewitnessspecific jury instruction that referenced scientific research findings. See Utah Model Jury
Instruction CR404, available at https://www.utcourts.gov/resources/muji/
inc_list.asp?action=showRule&id=32. Recently, however, courts and commentators
have concluded that instructions that comprehensively address all relevant factors that
may have affected the reliability of the identification is necessary. Such instructions will
provide jurors—who are often unfamiliar with, or hold views counter to, the scientific
research findings—sufficient guidance to evaluate eyewitness identification evidence.
The eyewitness-specific jury instructions recently adopted by Massachusetts and New
Jersey offer excellent examples of modern instructions that accomplish this goal. See
Gomes, 22 N.E.3d at 900 (adopting provisional jury instructions that were “intended to
provide the jury with the guidance they need to capably evaluate the accuracy of an
eyewitness identification” because “the research makes clear that common sense is not
enough to accurately discern the reliable eyewitness identification from the unreliable”)7;
7

(See also Massachusetts Model Jury Instructions on eyewitness identifications attached
as Addendum B.)
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New Jersey Supreme Court, Jury Instructions (July 19, 2012), available at
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/pressrel/2012/jury_instruction.pdf.8
II.

CONSIDERATION OF THE ONGOING ADMISSIBILITY OF EYEWITNESS
IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE IS NOT AN ENLARGEMENT OF THE
ISSUES
In its response to the Innocence Project’s Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae

Brief (the “Motion”), the State suggests that any argument that the Ramirez test is
outdated and should be replaced “has never been made in this case and would enlarge the
issues and the evidence before this Court.” (State’s Resp. to Mot. for Leave to File
Amicus Curiae Br. (“State’s Resp.”) at 3–4.) Accordingly, the State argues that this
Court is unable to reach the “expanded issue” raised by the Innocence Project, and the
State reserves the right to move to strike the present brief. (Id. at 4–5.) With all due
respect, the State’s position is preposterous.
The Court should reject the State’s position for at least two reasons. First, this
Court may consider the Innocence Project’s position regarding the sufficiency of the
Ramirez test because the parties themselves have raised the issue. Second, this Court

8

Even if the Court were to refrain from modifying the Ramirez test in light of
advancements in social science research, that research supports the lower court’s
suppression of the challenged show-up and in-court identifications. (See generally Br. of
Resp’t on Cert. Review (“Br. of Resp’t”).) The Court of Appeals correctly found that
facts relating to each of the five Ramirez factors weighed in favor of inadmissibility. See,
e.g., Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, ¶¶ 11–19.
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may consider social science research because it is valuable reference material that does
not expand the evidentiary record.9
A.

This Court Can Consider the Sufficiency of the Ramirez Test Because it
Bears on Issues Presented by Both Parties to this Court

Although an amicus brief cannot extend or enlarge the issues on appeal, this brief
makes arguments “that bear on the issues pursued by the parties to [an] appeal.” Madsen,
658 P.2d at 629 n.3. As this Court has explained, “[r]eview on certiorari is limited to
examining the court of appeals’ decision and is further circumscribed by the issues raised
in the petitions.” Coulter & Smith, Ltd. v. Russell, 966 P.2d 852, 856 (Utah 1998). The
statement of question presented, however, “will be deemed to comprise every subsidiary
question fairly included therein.” Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(4); see also Willardson v. Indus.
Comm’n of Utah, 904 P.2d 671, 673–74 (Utah 1995) (considering subsidiary issue to be
included in issue framed for review). Furthermore, “this rule should be construed
broadly to avoid the rigid exclusion of reviewable issues, however peripheral.” State v.
Leber, 2009 UT 59, ¶ 10, 216 P.3d 964 (quoting Sevy v. Sec. Title Co., 902 P.2d 629, 637
(Utah 1995)). Contrary to the State’s suggestion that the issue “has never been made in
this case,” its own petition for certiorari repeatedly referenced the Court of Appeals’
9

The State mischaracterizes the relevant case law in arguing that the introduction of an
alternative test to Ramirez would enlarge the issues before this Court. Even accepting
those cases it cites at face value, however, both are easily distinguishable from the
present case. In United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell and Madsen v. Borthick, the
parties had not pursued the issue that the amicus brief discussed. United Parcel Serv.,
Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 60 n.2 (1981); Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627, 629 n.3
(Utah 1983). In the present case, the Utah Court of Appeals, the State’s brief, and the
defendant’s brief all discuss whether Ramirez should be reexamined. Lujan, 2015 UT
App 199, ¶ 10 n.1; Br. of Pet’r at 19; Br. of Resp’t at 25–31.
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invitation to this Court to revisit the Ramirez test. (See, e.g., Pet. for a Writ of Cert. at
10.)
Throughout its petition, the State criticized the Court of Appeals for its treatment
of Ramirez and its recommendations to this Court. The State claimed the majority
merely “paid lip service to Ramirez,” while “it in effect imposed a standard exceeding
that required in Ramirez.” (Id.) The State also took issue with the Court of Appeals’
conclusion that the Ramirez standard “does not accurately reflect the changed views
about handling this problematic evidence.” (Id. (quoting Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, ¶ 10
n.1); see also id. at 17 (same).) Accordingly, the State specifically asked this Court to
grant certiorari “to clarify that state due process does not require the exclusion of
eyewitness identification unless it determines that it results from an unnecessarily
suggestive police identification procedure.” (Id. at 17.)
In its opening brief before this Court, the State reiterated many of the same issues
it raised in its petition. Specifically, the State noted that “[b]oth the majority and the
dissent urged review of the Ramirez standard for the admissibility of eyewitness
identification testimony, citing its age, the continuing legal and scientific concerns about
the reliability of eyewitness identifications, and the outcome in this case.” (Br. of Pet’r at
19.) And once again, the State implored this Court to “clarify the state due process
standard announced in Ramirez and reverse the court of appeals.” (Id.; see id. at 16–17
(asking the Court to “clarify its state due process model governing the admissibility of
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eyewitness identifications”); 29 (asking the Court to “clarify Ramirez to prevent further
confusion about and misapplication of the state due process analysis”).)10
Similarly, in his merits brief, the defendant raises concerns about Ramirez and
responds directly to the State’s complaints. (See, e.g., Br. of Resp’t at 25–31.) Because
both parties have made arguments concerning the Court of Appeals’ recommendation
that this Court revisit the Ramirez test, the Innocence Project’s brief does not extend or
enlarge the issues on appeal.
Accordingly, the Innocence Project respectfully requests that this Court consider
the present brief in its entirety and reject any attempt by the State to strike any portion of
it. To the extent the Court agrees with the State that portions of this brief extend or
enlarge the issues on appeal, the Innocence Project respectfully requests that the court
deny the motion to strike in part and consider the portions of the brief that “bear on the
issues pursued by the parties to this appeal.” Madsen, 658 P.2d at 629 n.3.
B.

This Court Can Consider Social Science Research in Deciding to Affirm
the Court of Appeals’ Decision

Even if the Court disagrees with the Innocence Project and finds that the issue of
the sufficiency of the Ramirez test was not raised before by the parties,11 the Court may
still consider the social science literature cited in this brief.

10

In addition, the State cites various studies regarding eyewitness testimony and appends
them to its opening brief. (See id. at 39–40, 43–44, 45, 47, Addendum D.)

11

Counsel for Mr. Lujan, in its brief before the Court of Appeals, noted this Court’s
review of the relevant scientific literature, which it described as “replete with empirical
studies documenting the unreliability of eyewitness identification.” (Br. of Appellant at
7–8 (citing Ramirez and Long).) Similarly, the State cited various studies regarding
20

The State has suggested that consideration of such literature would result in an
enlargement of the evidence. As discussed above, however, this Court has long
considered social science research to be a valuable resource, particularly in the context of
eyewitness identification evidence. See, e.g., Clopten, 2009 UT 84, ¶¶ 8, 15–38
(discussing at length the social science research surrounding “eyewitness fallibility and
the resulting possibility of mistaken identifications”); Long, 721 P.2d at 492 (Utah 1986)
(considering the Court to be “compelled by the overwhelming weight of the empirical
research to take steps to alleviate the difficulties inherent in any use of eyewitness
identification testimony”). Other state supreme courts agree. See, e.g., Lawson, 291 P.3d
at 685–86 (noting that “it is imperative that law enforcement, the bench, and the bar be
informed of the existence of current scientific research and literature regarding the
reliability of eyewitness identification”); Guilbert, 49 A.3d at 720 (holding that experts
may testify about the reliability of eyewitness identifications due to the “near perfect
scientific consensus” and “broad based judicial recognition” that “eyewitness
identifications are potentially unreliable in a variety of ways unknown to the average
juror,” as evidenced by scientific research on the topic); Henderson, 27 A.3d at 877
(adopting findings of court-appointed special master and finding that scientific evidence
presented “convincing proof that the current test for evaluating the trustworthiness of
eyewitness identifications should be revised,” and noting that “[s]tudy after study
revealed a troubling lack of reliability in eyewitness identifications”).
eyewitness testimony and appends them to its opening brief. (See Br. of Pet’r at 39–40,
43–44, 45, 47, Addendum D.)
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The social science research cited by the Innocence Project is analogous to
“legislative facts,” which are those that “inform policy-making decisions, as opposed to
adjudicative facts which are facts distinctive to a particular case.” Cruz v. Middlekauff
Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 909 P.2d 1252, 1259 n.1 (Utah 1996) (Zimmerman, J.,
concurring) (citing Robert E. Keeton, Judging 38–39 (1990); Utah R. Evid. 201 advisory
committee’s note). Justice Zimmerman, in explaining “[t]he propriety of considering
legislative facts in making policy decisions” cited a decision by the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York, which held that:
A court’s power to resort to less well known and accepted sources of data
to fill in the gaps of its knowledge for legislative and general evidential
hypothesis purposes must be accepted because it is essential to the judicial
process.
Id. (quoting Bulova Watch Co. v. K. Hattori & Co., 508 F. Supp. 1322, 1328 (E.D.N.Y.
1981)); accord State v. Santiago, 122 A.3d 1, 129 n.114 (Conn. 2015) (“To turn a blind
eye to relevant and well established scientific or sociological knowledge that the parties
may have overlooked or decided to leave unearthed, whether for strategic or financial
reasons, would unjustly and unwisely subject the public at large to the results of an illinformed decision.”); Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 323 (D.C. 1995)
(“[C]ourts traditionally answer questions of legislative fact, and thus questions of law, not
only by referring to evidence of record but also by considering non-record sources such
as scientific and social science studies found in law reviews and other journals.”).
A recent case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is
instructive on the issue of the applicability of social science research. In Young v.
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Conway, Amicus Curiae the Innocence Project presented the court with a “robust and
growing body of high-quality scientific studies addressing problems surrounding
eyewitness identifications.” Young v. Conway, 715 F.3d 79, 81 (2d Cir. 2013). The
Second Circuit ultimately decided to reference the studies in its opinion, “conclud[ing]
that it was a good idea to make trial judges aware of the existence of this information, in
effect, as additional tools to help them with their work.” Id. In so doing, the court made
clear that it merely “aims to point the bench and bar to the existence of the studies and to
go no further.” Id. In fact, the opinion itself is explicit that the court’s conclusion was
not “compelled or controlled” by the literature it cited; rather, they merely reinforced the
conclusion the court reached. Young v. Conway, 698 F.3d 69, 79 n.8 (2d Cir. 2012).
This Court should continue to consider social science literature as an important
tool in ensuring that it takes all appropriate steps to alleviate the difficulties inherent in
the use of eyewitness identification testimony.
III.

THE COURT OF APPEALS APPLIED THE CORRECT STANDARD WHEN
IT REQUIRED THE STATE TO DEMONSTRATE THAT ANY ERROR IN
ADMISSION OF EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION WAS HARMLESS
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT
Under Utah law, the introduction of an unreliable eyewitness identification is a

constitutional violation. See Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 779–81. Because the introduction of
the tainted identification testimony in this case violated Defendant-Respondent’s
constitutional right to due process, the Court of Appeals held that the State had the
burden of showing that the eyewitness identification testimony was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, ¶ 16. This conclusion was a straightforward
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application of this Court’s precedent. Where the error in question amounts to a violation
of a defendant’s constitutional rights, its “harmlessness is to be judged by a higher
standard, i.e., reversal is required unless the error is harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.” State v. Villarreal, 889 P.2d 419,425 (Utah 1995).
This Court’s approach to harmless error analysis is based on the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decision in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). That decision, in turn, is
based on the simple principle that the courts are responsible for protecting constitutional
rights. In establishing the “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” standard, the Chapman
Court recognized that courts possessed the “responsibility to protect” federal
constitutional rights so that “[p]etitioners are entitled to a trial free from the pressure of
unconstitutional inferences.” Id. at 21, 26. The Court recognized that “there are some
constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as
harmless error” and that an infringement of those rights would render the trial
unconstitutional. Id. at 23. The same considerations apply here. Defendant-Respondent
is entitled to a trial free from the pressure of unconstitutional inferences from eyewitness
testimony fraught with issues of unreliability.
Social science research on the extent to which jurors rely on eyewitness testimony
underscores how critical the harmless error standard is. Because jurors tend to
“overbelieve” eyewitness testimony to an extent that is not warranted by the facts, the
admission of eyewitness testimony that is unreliable can be extraordinarily harmful. See,
e.g., Jennifer N. Sigler & James V. Couch, Eyewitness Testimony and the Jury Verdict, 4
N. Am. J. Psychol. 143, 146 (2002) (finding that the conviction rate by mock juries
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increased from 49% to 68% when a single, vague eyewitness account was added to
circumstantial evidence). In addition, a study of the first 250 DNA exonerations
concluded that over 75 percent of those wrongful convictions involved mistaken
eyewitness identification. Brandon L. Garrett, Convicting the Innocent: Where Criminal
Prosecutions Go Wrong 8–9 (2011). The fact that 75 percent of wrongful convictions
involve mistaken eyewitness identifications counsels in favor of courts adhering to their
“responsibility to protect” defendants and their right to a trial free of tainted eyewitness
identification testimony.
The fact that the error identified by the Court of Appeals may have been solely a
violation of the Utah Constitution does not change this analysis. Just as federal courts
have the responsibility to safeguard defendants’ federal constitutional rights, so too do
the courts of this state have the parallel responsibility to safeguard defendants’ rights
under the state constitution. See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 421 (Utah 1991)
(Zimmerman, J., concurring). A violation of a defendant’s state constitutional rights is
no less serious than a violation of his rights under the U.S. Constitution. Even if federal
constitutional rights are not implicated, the State has the burden of proving that an error
resulting in a Utah state constitutional violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
This Court has held that Utah’s inquiry into due process is “as stringent as, if not more
stringent than, the federal analysis.” Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784. There is no reason to
relax that level of concern for defendants’ constitutional rights in the context of adopting
an appropriate standard of review. Insisting that the State demonstrate that the
introduction of tainted eyewitness identification testimony was harmless beyond a
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reasonable doubt ensures that this Court can uphold its responsibility to protect
defendants. See State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1240 (Utah 1996) (Stewart, J.,
concurring) (“The framers of the Utah Constitution necessarily intended that this Court
should be . . . the primary protector of individual liberties.”)
This approach is consistent with the law of other states. A number have adopted
the Chapman standard for violations under their respective state constitutions. See Van
Arsdall v. State, 524 A.2d 3, 11 (Del. 1987) (“[R]eversal is required whenever the
reviewing court cannot say that the error was beyond a reasonable doubt.”); State v.
Perry, 245 P.3d 961, 974 (Idaho 2010) (“Idaho shall from this point forward employ the
Chapman harmless error test for all objected-to error.”); State v. Bunch, 689 S.E.2d 866,
868 (N.C. 2010) (applying Chapman for jury-instruction error violating state
constitution). Similarly, a number of states require the prosecution to bear the burden of
proving that the error was harmless, although the standard is lower than beyond a
reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court of Montana, for example, has held that “the state
will carry the burden of persuading the Court . . . that the violation was harmless.” State
v. Charlie, 239 P.3d 934, 945 (Mont. 2010) (emphasis removed). Similarly, the Supreme
Court of Alaska held that the prosecution must assume the burden of proving that the
error was harmless. Bostic v. State, 805 P.2d 344, 347 (Alaska 1991) (noting that the
defendant is the “non-offending party” and that placing the burden on him would be
“manifestly unjust”).
Moreover, Connecticut and the District of Columbia have extended the Chapman
standard to violations of state law. See State v. Artis, 101 A.3d 915, 928 (Conn. 2014)
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(holding that state had burden of proving that admission of identification testimony was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt); Baker v. United States, 867 A.2d 988, 1004 (D.C.
2005) (applying Chapman to statement admitted in violation of court’s precedent).
This Court should make clear that the State has the burden of proving that errors
infringing upon state constitutional rights are harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Amicus Curiae the Innocence Project respectfully
requests that, in light of current social science research, this Court revise the framework it
set out in Ramirez, issue guidance on the importance of the “totality of the
circumstances” approach, and instruct the lower courts on intermediate remedies, in
accordance with the principles articulated above.
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